Donovan de Klerk v The Citizen et al
Complaint number: PCSA 000736
Ruling: Acting Press Ombud
Particulars
- The complaint concerns articles that were published from June 2025 to February 2026.
- De Klerk knows that his complaint was lodged out of time but still requests condonation of the late filing.
- The Public Advocate, Thabo Leshilo, has rejected the complaint.
- The publications support his decision.
- De Klerk then appeals that decision, which is why this matter has now landed on my desk.
- My adjudication is based on correspondence from De Klerk, Leshilo and Helene Viljoen Incorporated (on behalf of the publications).
Request for condonation of the late filing of a complaint
- De Klerk acknowledges the normal 20-working-day deadline, as stipulated under Clause 1.3 of the Complaints Procedures, and asks the Press Council to accept his complaint despite it being late.
- He argues that the combination of the complexity, the volume of evidence, ongoing proceedings, attempts to resolve matters through official channels, continuing damaging reporting, and significant later developments provide reasonable grounds for accepting the late complaint.
Top of Form
Dismissal by the Public Advocate
- The Public Advocate has dismissed the complaint due to its lateness.
- He argues inter alia that:
a. the articles complained of were published between June 2025 and February 2026, meaning that some are more than a year old and even the most recent is about five months old;
b. De Klerk’s argument that the delay was caused by complex criminal proceedings, regulatory matters, dealing with journalists, providing evidence, and instructing lawyers is insufficient, as he was actively responding to the reporting and could therefore also have lodged a complaint within the required period; and
c. his acceptance of the late complaints would set a bad precedent.
11. This means that the complaint was dismissed on procedural grounds, rather than on its merits.
The newspapers’ response
- The publications submit that the complaint was correctly dismissed because it was grossly out of time and because De Klerk has not justified the delay.
- Viljoen notes that the articles were published between June 2025 and 27–28 February 2026, while Clause 1.3 of the Complaints Procedures requires complaints within 20 working days of publication. The complaint was therefore several months late even in respect of the latest articles and more than a year late for the earliest.
- She says that De Klerk cites the complexity of the matter and ongoing criminal/regulatory proceedings as reasons for the delay. This is insufficient, she argues, because he was aware of the articles, engaged with journalists, gathered evidence and instructed lawyers throughout.
- De Klerk’s argument about a “series of publications” is also not persuasive – continuing coverage does not prevent separate, timely complaints. The rules do not allow a complainant to accumulate grievances over many months and bring them as one late complaint.
- Viljoen admits that De Klerk’s knowledge on 24 April 2026 that murder charges had been abandoned may affect the merits of some articles, particularly the accuracy of the murder narrative, but it does not explain why complaints about those, or other articles were not lodged within 20 working days.
- She emphasises that allowing condonation would undermine the purpose of the time limit, which is to ensure complaints are handled while editorial decisions, communications and journalists’ recollections are fresh. Reconstructing events surrounding articles up to 18 months old creates an inherent risk of prejudice, even if the publications retain records.
- In short: The publications say there is no sufficient basis for condonation – De Klerk was aware of the article and the matters about which he now complains, he failed to act within the prescribed period, and he has not provided a satisfactory explanation for the extensive delay.
De Klerk’s appeal
- De Klerk argues that there are reasonable and satisfactory grounds for accepting the complaint despite it being lodged late under Clause 1.3 of the Complaints Procedures.
- His main points are:
a. The complaint concerns a series of related publications, journalists and recurring allegations over an extended period, rather than one isolated article. A proper complaint therefore required a consolidated review of the reporting, evidence and alleged breaches;
b. The circumstances were exceptionally serious and ongoing. His priority at the time was dealing with the underlying events and criminal proceedings, assisting investigations, preserving evidence and responding to serious public allegations;
c. Responding to journalists was not equivalent to preparing a Press Council complaint. Engagement with journalists was aimed at correcting or preventing inaccurate reporting in real time, whereas a formal complaint required significant time and resources to identify publications, dates, statements, sources, documentary evidence and specific Press Code breaches;
d. The Director of Public Prosecutions’ (DPP’s) decision was not known at the time it was made. Although the DPP apparently decided on 15 June 2026 to abandon the murder charges, the accused, defence and the magistrate only became aware of this decision at the Pre-Trial Conference on 24 April 2026. This was unexpected and significant because the case had apparently continued on the understanding that the accused would stand trial, including on murder charges, on 28 September 2026;
e. The official DPP documentation had to be obtained thereafter. He could not reasonably rely on a decision they did not know existed and subsequently had to await the Prosecutor’s formal confirmation of the abandonment;
f. The delay was not caused by indifference to the Press Council. His engagement with journalists was part of efforts to address inaccurate reporting during an ongoing crisis, rather than evidence that he had the capacity to prepare a comprehensive regulatory complaint;
g. The complaint raises matters of significant public interest and is supported by extensive documentary evidence, rather than being vague or speculative; and
h. The late filing does not cause unfair prejudice to the publications. He argues that the respondents remain able to respond to the allegations despite the delay.
21. De Klerk asks me to consider the full circumstances rather than the delay in isolation, exercise the discretion under Clause 1.3, and allow the complaint to proceed through the ordinary Press Council process.
My decision
- Having carefully considered all the arguments, I fully agree with the Public Advocate’s decision to dismiss the complaint, as well as with the publications’ motivation for supporting Leshilo’s judgment.
- De Klerk’s appeal is hereby dismissed.
Appeals procedure
The Complaints Procedure stipulates that within seven working days of receipt of this decision, either party may apply for leave to appeal to the Chairperson of the SA Press Appeals Panel, Judge Bernard Ngoepe, fully setting out the grounds of appeal. He can be contacted at khanyim@presscouncilsa.org.za
Johan Retief
Acting Press Ombud
13 August 2026
